United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians

No. 79-639. Argued March 24, 1980. Decided June 30, 1980. 448 U.S. 371.

II

Although the Court refrains from so boldly characterizing its action, it is obvious from these facts that Congress has reviewed the decisions of the Court of Claims, set aside the judgment that no taking of the Black Hills occurred, set aside the judgment that there is no cognizable reason for relitigating this claim, and ordered a new trial. I am convinced that this is nothing other than an exercise of judicial power reserved to Art. III courts that may not be performed by the Legislative Branch under its Art. I authority. Article III vests "the judicial Power . . . of the United States" in federal courts.

Congress is vested by Art. I with legislative powers, and may not itself exercise an appellate-type review of judicial judgments in order to alter their terms, or to order new trials of cases already decided. The judges in Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 413, n. 4 (1792), stated [448 U.S. 428] that

"no decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the Constitution, be liable to a reversion, or even suspension, by the Legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested. We have interpreted the decision in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), as having rested upon the ground that . . . Congress was without constitutional authority to control the exercise of . . . judicial power . . . by requiring this Court to set aside the judgment of the Court of Claims, and as holding that Congress may not "require a new trial of the issues . . . which the Court had resolved against [a party]" Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8, 9 (1944).

This principle was again applied in United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. 641, 647 (1875), where the Court refused to legitimize a congressional attempt to revise a final judgment rendered by the Court of Claims finding that such judgments

"are beyond all doubt the final determination of the matter in controversy; and it is equally certain that the judgments of the Court of Claims, where no appeal is taken to this court, are, under existing laws, absolutely conclusive of the rights of the parties unless a new trial is granted by that court."

The Court further found that there is only one Supreme Court, and

"[i]t is quite clear that Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the reexamination and revision of any other tribunal or any other department of the government" Id. at 648. See also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).

Congress has exceeded the legislative boundaries drawn by these cases and the Constitution and exercised judicial power in a case already decided by effectively ordering a new trial.

The determination of whether this action is an exercise of legislative or judicial power is, of course, one of characterization. The fact that the judicial process is affected by an Act of Congress [448 U.S. 429] is not dispositive, since many actions which this Court has clearly held to be legitimate exercises of legislative authority do have an effect on the judiciary and its processes. Congress may legitimately exercise legislative powers in the regulation of judicial jurisdiction, and it may, like other litigants, change the import of a final judgment by establishing new legal rights after the date of judgment, and have an effect on the grounds available for a court's decision by waiving available defenses.

But, as the Court apparently concedes, Congress may not, in the name of those legitimate actions, review and set aside a final judgment of an Art. III court and order the courts to rehear an issue previously decided in a particular case.

The Court relies heavily on the fact that Congress was acting pursuant to its power to pay the Nation's debts. No doubt, Congress has broad power to do just that, but it may do so only through the exercise of legislative, not judicial, powers. Thus the question must be, not whether Congress was attempting to pay its debts through this Act, but whether it attempted to do so by means of judicial power.

The Court suggests that the congressional action in issue is justified as either a permissible regulation of jurisdiction, the creation of a new obligation, or the mere waiver of a litigant's right. These alternative nonjudicial characterizations of the congressional action, however, are simply unpersuasive.

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